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Reconstruction, “the period from 1865 to 1877 when national efforts were concentrated 
on incorporating the South back into the Union after the Civil War,” was one of the most 
turbulent periods of US history.1 Throughout the Reconstruction era, the Republican Party 
favored a process that would secure the rights of black Southerners, which faced opposition from 
many Democrats. This pushback often took the form of political violence against white 
Republicans in the South as well as freedpeople who attempted to take part in politics and assert 
their newly granted rights of citizenship. Mounting opposition against the federal government’s 
Reconstruction policy in the South led to unrest as some Southerners engaged in organized 
political violence in order to maintain aspects of antebellum society.  
In this paper I argue that in particular, Mississippi and Georgia during the late 1860s and 
early 1870s were states where racial, social, and political tension erupted into violence. Both 
Mississippi, a state famous for organized political terror in what would become known as the 
Mississippi Plan, and Georgia, where residents initially took a more subtle approach to 
disenfranchisement of black residents, had Democrats who ultimately utilized political violence 
in their reconstruction plans. The terror was significant because it served as a way for white 
Southern Democrats to maintain political and social control over freedpeople, overthrow 
Republican governments in Southern states, strengthen white supremacy, and ultimately bring 
about an end to Reconstruction in the South. The social and political chaos in the wake of the 
Civil War created a space for white Southern Democrats to engage in political violence, and 
bring about the end of Reconstruction. 
                                                
1 Charles Reagan Wilson, “Reconstruction,” in The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture: 
Volume 10: Law and Politics, ed. James W. Ely and Bradley G. Bond (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 226.  
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After the Civil War ended in 1865, the federal and state governments began deliberating 
to determine a process for reunifying the nation. This was extremely difficult for several reasons, 
especially the fact that the highly destructive Civil War was unprecedented, so there was no 
blueprint for how best to reunite the nation. Reconstruction sought to bring the nation together 
again, restructure the Southern economy into a free labor society, and address the question of 
political rights for freedpeople. It was a process of trial and error, as various individuals and 
groups argued about the best course of action for the country. In addition, the assassination of 
President Abraham Lincoln sent shock waves across the nation and thrust Andrew Johnson into 
the presidency. Johnson’s approach to Reconstruction put him at odds with many members of 
Congress, especially the Radical Republicans, in terms of creating a plan for Reconstruction and 
this added to the confusion and uncertainty of the process in the South. 2  
Another barrier to the process was the enormity of the task of restructuring the entirety of 
the Southern social, economic, and political systems. Prior to the war, a racialized system of 
slavery was crucial to society. While the war did not bring about an end to racism by any means, 
the abolition of slavery posed a threat to the general stability of these Southern states as well as 
the power of white supremacy. When Georgia’s Alexander Stephens served as Vice President of 
the Confederacy he claimed, “[The Confederate States government’s] foundations are laid, its 
cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery, 
subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”3 In Mississippi and 
                                                
2 Radical Republicans were those with a “deep commitment to racial equality” and they believed 
that “Federal and state governments should be color-blind, with civil rights guaranteed to all 
regardless of race” (K. Stephen Prince, introduction to Radical Reconstruction, [Boston, MA: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016], 5).  
3 In his Cornerstone Address given on March 21, 1861, Stephens spoke about the important role 
slavery played in the formation of the Confederacy, and urged other slave states to join 
(Alexander H. Stephens, “Cornerstone Address,” in Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November 
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Georgia, as well as in many other places across the South, slavery was a critical component of 
antebellum society. In 1860, Georgia and Mississippi ranked second and third among the states 
for the highest slave population.4 According to the United States Census Bureau, in 1860 
Georgia contained 462,198 slaves out of a total state population of 1,057,286 residents.5 
Mississippi had 436,631 slaves with a total state population of 791,305 residents.6 The sheer 
number of slaves in these states, and the wealth they generated highlights the critical role slavery 
played in their social, political, and economic systems. For example, prior to the outbreak of the 
Civil War, Mississippi was a hub of plantation slavery where a “robust plantocracy” built 
mansions to showcase their wealth, status, and power.7 From 1800 to 1860 the population in the 
state grew rapidly alongside the increase in cotton production in the area, making many 
slaveholders incredibly wealthy.8  
In antebellum Mississippi, black men, women, and children were bought and sold, 
separated from their families, overworked, and beaten in order for the state’s economy to boom 
and plantation owners to become rich. Slaves who were “doomed to the block” were examined 
and sold to the highest bidder, as though they were nothing but livestock or furniture.9 After 
these auctions, plantation owners forced their slaves to labor under horrible conditions and often 
                                                
1860-April 1861, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, and Jon L. Wakelyn [Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996], 402-412).  
4 United States Census Bureau, 1870 Census Volume 1. The Statistics of the Population of the 
United States, Population by States and Territories 1790-1870, table 1, accessed March 26, 2020, 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1870/population/1870a-04.pdf#. 
5 United States Census Bureau, 1870 Census. 
6 United States Census Bureau, 1870 Census. 
7 Marc R. Matrana, “Mississippi,” in Lost Plantations of the South, (Jackson, MS: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2009), 142. 
8 Matrana, “Mississippi,” 142.	
9 Joseph B. Cobb, Mississippi Scenes, Or, Sketches of Southern and Western Life and Adventure: 
Humorous, Satirical, and Descriptive, Including the Legend of Black Creek, (Philadelphia: T.K. 
and P.G. Collins, Printers, 1851), 90.  
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beat and humiliated them. In addition to the physical misery that slaves experienced in 
antebellum Mississippi, hatred and racism ran deep through Southern society, and slaves were 
viewed as sub-human. In his 1851 book on Mississippi, writer Joseph Cobb claimed,  
A southern negro is regarded as a living deformity of vice and prostitution, a being with 
the shape of man, but lower in infamy than the brute; a member of the great human 
family whose situation is so depraved and isolated…so entirely cut off from sympathy 
with the human race, that all association with him is considered dangerous and 
contaminating.10 
 
Many white Mississippians felt a sense of superiority over their slaves and this was deeply 
entrenched throughout the state’s institutions. This poor treatment of slaves and the sentiment 
that they were not worthy of respect makes clear the difficulty of promoting political rights to 
freedpeople in the Reconstruction period, barely two decades after Cobb wrote his text on life in 
Mississippi. Yet, the reliance on slavery and tense relationships between slaves and slaveholders 
was not unique to Mississippi in the antebellum era. Georgia’s economy also relied heavily on 
slave labor and its dependence on slavery in the antebellum period foreshadows its resistance to 
the postwar reconstruction process. In antebellum Georgia, many white families in the central 
part of the state were slaveholders, while “the rest owed their livelihoods and social privileges to 
slavery.”11 Thus, after emancipation the entire state was thrust into confusion and the livelihood 
of many white families was jeopardized. 
Eric Foner further details the difficulty associated with the Southern states coming to 
terms with the end of slavery. He explains that, “…the rebelling Southern states…could not 
resume their erstwhile position without acknowledging the destruction of slavery—a requirement 
                                                
10 Cobb, Mississippi Scenes, Or, Sketches of Southern and Western Life and Adventure, 156. 
11 Joseph P. Reidy, From Slavery to Agrarian Capitalism in the Cotton Plantation South: Central 
Georgia, 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 108. 
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that implied far-reaching changes in Southern society and politics.”12 While voting eligibility 
was granted to nearly all adult white men in the antebellum era South, “slavery everywhere 
undergirded a pattern of political and economic privilege which seemed to discriminate against 
non-slaveholders.”13 These antebellum slaveholders controlled politics, and thereby society. 
However, when slavery was abolished and freedmen were granted political rights, including the 
right to vote, this political system and the power structures within it began to shift. The powerful 
Southern whites who had previously dominated politics now had to watch their former slaves 
casting ballots.14 Many political elites believed that these black men were not fit to participate 
politically and this created tension that boiled over into everyday life in the South and formed a 
barrier to Reconstruction. 
The process of Reconstruction was further exacerbated by the pressure the federal 
government was under to reunify the country. When the war ended, the South needed to be 
brought back into the nation and Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson believed this 
needed to be done in a timely manner. The longer it took for a course of action to be planned and 
implemented, the more difficult it would be to bring the nation together, as keeping the Southern 
states in a sort of limbo was inefficient and chaotic. This is evident through both Mississippi and 
Georgia, which were not fully readmitted to the Union until 1870, several years later than many 
                                                
12 Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 
1990), 35.   
13 Harry L. Watson, “Conflict and Collaboration: Yeomen, Slaveholders, and Politics in the 
Antebellum South,” Social History 10, no. 3 (1985): 274. 
14 The Fifteenth Amendment allowed freedmen to cast ballots in US elections. It reads, “The 
rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (United States 
Constitution. art, XV, §1). 
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of the other Southern states.15 A large portion of the problem with Reconstruction lay in the fact 
that restructuring the South required more than simply declaring the nation whole again.  
As previously noted, the Southern economic, social, and political systems needed to be 
rebuilt without slavery and this process required time and resources. Therefore, a paradox 
emerged as President Johnson wanted to reunify the nation as painlessly and quickly as possible, 
while it became increasingly clear that this process could not happen overnight. Further, 
Thaddeus Stevens, an influential Radical Republican in Congress, argued for a complete 
transformation of the South in the post-war era, a plan that could not be accomplished quickly. 
Stevens argued,  
In reconstruction…reformation must be effected; the foundation of [the South’s] 
institutions, both political, municipal, and social must be broken up and relaid, or all our 
blood and treasure have been spent in vain. This can only be done by treating and holding 
them as a conquered people.16  
 
The South could not be transformed easily and quickly if the impacts were to be long-lasting. 
Thus, the paradox of time created another roadblock for the success of Reconstruction in both 
Mississippi and Georgia. 
After Lincoln was assassinated and Johnson became President, Johnson chose to 
implement a lenient process of re-entry for the former Confederate states in hopes of bringing the 
nation together as quickly as possible. He believed that as president he should be the one to 
decide on a Reconstruction plan, not Congress because the president is elected by the people and 
                                                
15 James Wilford Garner, Ph.M., Reconstruction in Mississippi (London: The Macmillan 
Company, 1901), 273-274. William Harris Bragg, “Reconstruction,” in The Civil War in 
Georgia: A New Georgia Encyclopedia Companion, ed. John C. Inscoe (Athens, GA: University 
of Georgia Press, 2011), 193.  
16 This excerpt came from a speech given by Thaddeus Stevens at the Pennsylvania’s Republican 
state convention in Lancaster in September 1865 (Eric Foner, “Thaddeus Stevens and the 
Imperfect Republic,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 60, no. 2 [1993]: 
147-148). 
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represents “all American people.”17 One historian described Johnson as, “[c]onfident of the 
correctness of his ideas, feeling sure that they were the only logical results of a true interpretation 
of the Constitution, [Johnson] pursued his policy of Reconstruction.”18 His plan stood in stark 
contrast to the beliefs he expressed immediately after his inauguration. Initially, Johnson stressed 
that the former Confederates were traitors and thus deserved to be met with severity and 
punishment.19 He even went so far as to claim, “[t]reason must be made odious, and traitors must 
be punished and impoverished.”20 
However, when it came time to implement a Reconstruction strategy, Johnson’s actions 
did not match up to his earlier sentiments. Johnson’s plan involved great leniency and he 
ultimately dispensed numerous pardons to Southerners.21 He was “[f]iercely committed to states’ 
rights in handling the Reconstruction questions,” and his plan placed the responsibility mainly on 
the individual Southern states to direct their own Reconstruction processes.22 Charles Chadsey 
details the basis of Johnson’s plan and writes that it “seemed to commit to a recently 
insurrectionary people the whole responsibility for proper reconstruction.”23 Therefore, 
Johnson’s plan placed great trust in the Southern states to direct their own reconstruction and did 
not involve much federal oversight. This minimal federal role in the process laid the groundwork 
                                                
17 Michael Les Benedict, “Andrew Johnson,” in The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living 
History, ed. Ken Gormley (New York: NYU Press, 2016), 232. 
18 Charles Chadsey, Ph.D., “The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress over 
Reconstruction,” in Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 8, no. 1 (1896): 39.  
19 Chadsey, “The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction,” 32.  
20 Mark L. Bradley, The Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Washington D.C.: CMH 
Publications, 2015), 9. 
21 Chadsey, “The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction,” 32. 
22 Benedict, “Andrew Johnson,” 229. 
23 Chadsey, “The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction,” 39.	
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for Southern states to continue their racially biased legal systems, and it influenced the later 
inability of the federal government to intervene in order to quell the political violence. 
A speedy reunification process such as the one implemented by Johnson was not popular 
with all government officials. President Johnson and many Republicans in Congress were at odds 
over several pieces of legislation that involved “the question of the status and future of the 
newly-freed blacks in the South.”24 The Radical Republicans wanted the Southern states to pay 
for their act of secession and sought to prevent a restoration of the antebellum status quo.25 They 
believed federal oversight and aid through programs such as the Freedmen’s Bureau were 
necessary, while Johnson wanted to grant the southern states autonomy in directing their own 
reconstruction.26 This tension and hostility further damaged the possibility of a smooth 
Reconstruction, as President Johnson vetoed bills such as the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 due to his dedication to states’ rights.27 In the end, Johnson’s plan of 
Reconstruction allowed Southern states to re-enter the Union in a quick fashion and his lenient 
oversight of these states created conditions where violence could occur.  
In Mississippi, Johnson’s leniency with his Reconstruction plan was evident, as it 
allowed for the creation of Black Codes in the state. These racial codes, the first in the postwar 
South, severely restricted the opportunities of freedpeople in Mississippi.28 The intent of these 
                                                
24 Andrew Johnson, The Papers of Andrew Johnson Volume 10, February-July 1866, ed. Paul H. 
Bergeron (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee, 1992), xii.  
25 Thaddeus Stevens was one Radical Republican who supported temporary disenfranchisement 
of the former Confederates in order to give power to “loyal whites” and freedpeople (Foner, 
“Thaddeus Stevens and the Imperfect Republic,” 150). 
26 Benedict, “Andrew Johnson,” 229, 231.	
27 Benedict, “Andrew Johnson,” 231. 
28 In November 1865 Mississippi became the first state to enact black codes and many other 
Southern states followed their example. These Black Codes granted some rights to freedpeople 
while simultaneously discriminating against them. Black Mississippians gained the right to 
marry, own property, and testify in court. However, others ensured freedpeople continued to 
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codes was to maintain white supremacy within the state and disadvantage black Mississippians. 
Specifically, the laws heavily restricted the economic opportunities and movements of black 
Mississippians.29 Nicholas Lemann writes,  
Like other Confederate states, Mississippi had, just after the war, with the tacit 
encouragement of President Andrew Johnson, convened a legislature made up mainly of 
unrepentant Confederates, and it had passed ‘black codes’ that legislated the freed slaves 
into a condition as close to their former one as it was possible to get without actually 
reinstituting slavery.30  
 
The creation of these black codes and the lack of oversight on the part of Johnson and the federal 
government set the stage for the political violence that would erupt in the mid-1870s as 
unchecked white Southern Democrats violently exerted political control over newly freed people. 
 Georgia took a different route for crafting its reconstruction process and granting freedom 
and liberties to newly freed slaves in the state. The Georgia legislature did not pass the same 
degree of “black codes” that Mississippi did during this era.31 Yet, this lack of severity in 
Georgia’s laws did not stem from a concern for the newly emancipated slaves in the state. In 
fact, a common sentiment among white Georgians was, “[h]atred, fear, resentment, and distrust 
of the [black population].”32 Instead, Georgia’s elites planned to grant black men just enough 
rights and liberties to minimize interference from the Freedmen’s Bureau33 or other federal 
                                                
work as agricultural laborers (“Mississippi Black Codes, 1865,” in Reconstruction: a Reference 
Guide, ed. Paul E. Teed and Melissa Ladd Teed [Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015], 
203).  
29 “Mississippi Black Codes, 1865,” in Reconstruction, 203.  
30 Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2006), 34. 
31 Alan Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1966), 55. 
32 Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia, 63. 
33 The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands or the “Freedmen’s Bureau” was 
an agency of the federal government that provided “social welfare programs to the former 
rebellious states and their localities” and the primary goal “to assist and protect the freedmen in 
their new social status.” Congress passed the legislation to create the Bureau on March 3, 1865 
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institutions.34 The seemingly benign nature of Georgia’s reconstruction plan kept federal 
involvement at a minimum and allowed Georgia to maintain greater control over its 
reconstruction process. This autonomy ultimately created the conditions for violence and terror 
to spring up across the state with relatively little consequence. Once again, Johnson’s leniency 
allowed the states to choose their own reconstruction paths, and the lack of federal oversight led 
to violence and the victimization of black people across the South, particularly in Georgia and 
Mississippi. 
After the Civil War the entire economic system of the slave South had to be altered and 
this shift was another point of tension between black Southerners and white Southern Democrats, 
which erupted into violence. The Federal Government’s expectation that the South was to 
become a free labor society was not popular among many Southerners, especially white 
plantation owners. There was a widely held belief across the Southern states that freedpeople 
would not labor without force because they were greedy or lazy. These sentiments are expressed 
in a report from Sidney Andrews, who travelled to various Southern states in the postwar period 
and reported on white Southern attitudes towards free black labor. His report documents some 
Southerners’ belief that, “[t]he experiment of free [black] labor is bound to be a failure…” 
because black men and women would not labor on their own without the coercion of slavery.35  
In addition to the belief that black Southerners would not labor freely, many Southern 
whites also had the opinion that black men were unfit to participate in government. This would 
become a major roadblock to a peaceful and efficient Reconstruction process, as the issue of 
                                                
(Ira C. Colby, “The Freedmen's Bureau: From Social Welfare to Segregation,” Phylon [1960-
201]) 46, no. 3 [1985]: 219-220). 
34 Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia, 55.  
35 Sidney Andrews, The South Since the War: as Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and 
Observation in Georgia and the Carolinas, (Boston, MA: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), 101. 
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rights and citizenship and who could claim them often led to violence. In Georgia for example, 
the granting of freedoms and rights to black residents was a subjective and sporadic process. 
Essentially, as Andrews reports, in the South, “the position decreed for the Negro was one of 
political oblivion, social inferiority, and superficial legal equality. Legal equality was entirely 
dependent upon the good will and the genuine desire of the lawmakers and law enforcers to 
provide equality of treatment before the law.”36 While legal equality among black and white 
Georgians existed in theory, a power imbalance between the races was the reality. 
The belief that black men were not qualified to govern is evident in Georgia’s changes to 
their legislature throughout the Reconstruction era. While there were thirty-three black 
legislators elected in Georgia in 1868, they faced scrutiny and hostility as they “attempted to take 
their seats for the opening of the Georgia General Assembly.”37 The white members of the 
legislature voted to bar all the black members, and were successful in doing so,38 claiming that 
black members of the legislature were “unconstitutional” and this increased tensions within the 
state.39 At the time these black men were elected, the once explicit racial requirements for 
holding public office were no longer included in the state’s constitution, therefore the election of 
black legislators was legal, although still contested.40 
In Georgia’s 1865 constitution, signed in November, the requirements for holding state 
office included a racial component, specifying that, “[t]he electors of members of the General 
                                                
36 Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia, 56-57. 
37 Robert A. Holmes, “The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus: An Analysis of a Racial 
Legislative Subgroup,” in Journal of Black Studies 30, no. 6 (2000): 768-769.  
38 W.E.B. Dubois, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880 (New York, NY: The Free Press, 
1935), 503. Holmes, “The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus,” 769. 
39 John M. Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” in The Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1976): 151-152. 
40 Georgia Const. of 1865, art. V §1. Georgia Const. of 1868, art. III §1 
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Assembly shall be free white male citizens of this State...and no person not qualified to vote for 
members of the General Assembly shall hold any office in this State.”41 However, in the state’s 
1868 constitution the voting and office-holding requirements do not utilize racial language and 
simply require that the elected officials be citizens of the State for at least one or two years 
depending on the office.42 The ousting of Georgia’s black legislators thus received backlash from 
those who supported equality among the races as the existence of black legislators did not 
explicitly violate any portion of the state’s revised constitution. The removal of Georgia’s thirty-
three black legislators attracted national attention, and when it was paired with the political 
violence that erupted in the state, it sparked federal involvement that Georgia previously tried to 
avoid by passing their more lenient black codes. 
Political violence carried out by the Ku Klux Klan played a major role in Georgia’s post-
1867 elections. The tactics used by the Klan to intimidate black voters heavily impacted the 
results of these races. This was particularly true in 1868, as this year marked the first presidential 
election in Georgia in the postwar period. In his piece on Reconstruction Georgia, John 
Matthews observes that in regard to the question of whether, “fraud, intimidation and violence, 
including the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, characterized this election there can be no doubt.”43 
The violence perpetrated by the Klan in Georgia was purposeful, obvious, and precise. In fact, 
“Klan violence was rarely random, and white raiders did not simply assault blacks for being 
black.”44 This distinction is crucial because random violence would have minimized its political 
impact and been less successful in keeping white men in power in the state of Georgia. Fear and 
                                                
41 Georgia Const. of 1865, art. V §1.  
42 Georgia Const. of 1868, art. III §1.	
43 Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” 153-154. 
44 Douglas R. Egerton, The Wars of Reconstruction (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2014), 
290. 
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hostility still led some white Georgians to engage in less organized violence if they felt that their 
power as white men was under attack. In fact, “[a]ny assault upon the citadel of white supremacy 
could bring an instinctive violent reaction, not so much on a personal basis but against the race 
generally.”45 There were many calculated instances of political violence, yet fear and paranoia 
led to some more generalized violence against black Georgians during this era. 
Many of these calculated acts of violence were carried out by organized groups of white 
supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan was essentially, “a terrorist group that used 
violence against blacks and white Republicans in the name of preserving the morality and virtue 
of white civilization.”46 Members of the Klan in Georgia claimed they were,  
an organization, a brotherhood of the property-holders, the peaceable, law-abiding 
citizens of the State, for self-protection. The instinct of self-protection prompted the 
organization; the sense of insecurity and danger, particularly in those neighborhoods 
where the [black] population largely predominated.47  
 
This viewpoint expressed by Klan members highlights that they either believed, or wanted others 
to believe, that their organization was one of merely protective aims, seeking to defend 
themselves from a black population they deemed as dangerous. However, historian Eric Foner 
counters the claim of self-protection and instead states, “[The Klan] aimed to reverse the 
interlocking changes sweeping over the South during Reconstruction: to destroy the Republican 
party’s infrastructure, undermine the Reconstruction state, reestablish control of the black labor 
force, and restore racial subordination in every aspect of Southern life.”48 Essentially he argues 
                                                
45 Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia, 64. 
46 Wilson, “Reconstruction,” 270. 
47 John B. Gordon, “Testimony of a Georgia Leader, 1871,” in Reconstruction [1865-1877], ed. 
Richard N. Current (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), 99.		
48 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, First ed., New 
American Nation Series (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1988), 426. 
 14 
that the Klan wanted to maintain as many aspects of the antebellum South as possible, including 
upholding white supremacy and taking control over the former slaves.  
The elections of 1868 served as the perfect opportunity for the Klan to increase its scope 
and intensity, as its members fought to maintain white supremacy and restore Democratic rule to 
the South. Eager to control the elections as well as to “keep [black men] in [their] place 
economically, socially, and politically,” the Klan escalated its violence that year in Georgia.49 In 
addition, the absence of an effective military force to combat political terrorism created a space 
for the KKK to rise and maintain a stronghold in the state. 1868 was the first presidential election 
since the end of the Civil War and a lot was on the line for the residents of Georgia. Therefore, 
some white Democrats were willing to utilize a variety of tactics to maintain their own power. 
This election had the potential to either uphold white supremacy in the state and keep Georgia’s 
freed people in a subservient position despite the end of slavery, or allow these black men to 
have a voice in the political realm and undercut the institution of white supremacy. Thus, 
tensions were high as “Conservative Georgia whites were determined to win back control of their 
government, but at the same time, newly-enfranchised blacks along with white Republicans 
(scalawags and carpetbaggers)50 were equally determined to retain their voice in Georgia 
politics.”51 These tensions played out in political acts of violence throughout the year. 
                                                
49 Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction, 
First ed. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971), 227. 
50 Carpetbaggers were Northern men who moved to the South in the postwar period while 
scalawags were white Southerners who supported Reconstruction and both groups were a part of 
the Republican Party (Peter Kolchin, “Scalawags, Carpetbaggers, and Reconstruction: A 
Quantitative Look at Southern Congressional Politics, 1868-1872,” in The Journal of Southern 
History 45, no. 1 [1979]: 63).  
51 Lee W. Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868: Racial Violence as Political Propaganda,” 
in The Georgia Historical Quarterly 71, no. 3 (1987): 401. 
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Despite its slow beginning, organized political violence reached a higher, more intense, 
and more widespread level in Georgia than anywhere else in the South. In particular, Warren 
County, Georgia “descended much further into terrorism in 1869 than most Southern counties 
ever got.”52 In this area, “Ku Klux Klan violence began seriously in the summer of 1868. Night 
riding, with accompanying whippings and shootings, became an almost nightly occurrence, and 
the Klan murdered its first Negro in September.”53 Yet, Warren County was not the only locale 
in Georgia to experience intense political terrorism as men, women, and children across the state 
were impacted by this violence.  
Typically, the assaults were targeted at black Georgians, yet some white people were 
subjected to political terrorism if they were seen as obstacles to the Democratic Party or white 
supremacy groups in the area.54 A prime example of this was the murder of George Ashburn, a 
white Republican who was killed on March 31, 1868 by what was thought to be his political 
enemies, members of the Democratic Party in disguise.55 Many instances of political violence 
were never reported, however, because of the lack of justice within the state, and the victims’ 
reluctance to come forward. Despite horrific acts of violence, terror, and rage, there was little 
justice for victims of the KKK, and the lack of consequences served as motive for Klan members 
to continue their violent acts.56 
                                                
52 Trelease, White Terror, 226. 
53 Trelease, White Terror, 227. 
54 Trelease, White Terror, 227. 
55 The official death reports indicate that it was “parties unknown” who murdered George 
Ashburn while others believe it was carried out by the KKK and still others think it was 
members of Ashburn’s own political party (Elizabeth Otto Daniell, “The Ashburn Murder Case 
in Georgia Reconstruction, 1868,” in The Georgia Historical Quarterly 59, no. 3 [1975]: 300). 
56 Trelease, White Terror, 230. 
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 The story of Perry Jeffers and his family sheds light on the experience of black families 
who the Klan deemed to be obstacles to white supremacy in the state. Klansmen came to Perry 
Jeffers’ home after hearing he was going to vote for Ulysses S. Grant and shot at him through the 
walls.57 He returned fire and killed and injured some of the men.58 They later returned with 50 to 
100 men to find only Jeffers’ wife and their bedridden son at the house while the other family 
members hid in the woods.59 Yet this did not deter the assailants. from committing horrible acts 
of violence towards the wife and sick child.60 Trelease details the heinous crime, noting that the 
two: 
were dragged outside, and the son was shot eleven times. The Klansmen then threw out 
the cabin’s contents—furniture, feather mattresses, and all—making a pile of them in the 
yard. To this they added the boy’s body and then set fire to the whole. Finally they seized 
the mother and with a length of bed cord hung her from a tree. As soon as they rode off, 
the woman was cut down; she survived but continued to bear the marks of her 
treatment.61 
 
This incident of Klan violence highlights the severity of the harm inflicted upon black Georgians 
as well as the cruelty of the Klan members who would murder a sick child in order to impact the 
political leanings of the boy’s father. 
 The violence in Georgia did not go unnoticed by a national audience, and while justice 
was rarely administered to the victims, some individuals tried to ease the situation and provide 
aid to those impacted by the violence by documenting their stories. In the late 1860s in Georgia 
“[c]ommittees were organized to gather reports of violence that allegedly accompanied the 
presidential campaign, going on at the same time, and to present this information to Congress.”62 
                                                
57 Trelease, White Terror, 229. 
58 Trelease, White Terror, 229. 
59 Trelease, White Terror, 229. 
60 Trelease, White Terror, 229. 
61 Trelease, White Terror, 229. 
62 Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” 152, 153. 
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Delegates at an all-black protest convention in Macon, Georgia created these committees as they, 
“expressed the feeling of outrage that prevailed in the fall of 1868” and “warned whites of the 
growing independence of black voters.”63 Stories that were documented during these efforts 
provide evidence for the political terrorism that individuals experienced in Georgia during 
Reconstruction.  
Caroline Smith was one such individual who testified before the Congressional 
Committee about her experience as a black woman facing Klan violence.64 She details how they 
took her out of her house at night and whipped because she was accused of disrespecting a white 
woman.65 This experience highlights the abuse that black men, women, and children faced in 
Georgia during Reconstruction and the efforts to try to “keep [black men and women] in [their] 
place” of social, economic, and political subservience.66 
 Abram Colby’s experiences show the varying tactics and the degree of violence utilized 
by members of the Democratic Party to impact the elections in Georgia. Colby testified to the 
Congressional Committee about his experiences with political terrorism.67 He claimed that some 
members of the Democratic Party in Georgia offered him $5,000 if he would agree to give up his 
                                                
63 Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” 153. 
64 Caroline Smith testified in Atlanta on October 21, 1871. Caroline Smith, “Testimony to the 
Congressional Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, October 21, 1871,” in Reconstruction Violence 
and the Ku Klux Klan Hearings, ed. Shawn L. Alexander (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 
2015), 35-36. 
65 Smith, “Testimony to the Congressional Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, October 21, 1871,” 
35-36. 
66 Trelease, White Terror, 227. 
67 Abram Colby testified on October 27 and 28, 1871 in Atlanta Georgia. Abram Colby, 
“Testimony to the Congressional Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, October 27 and 28, 1871,” in 
Reconstruction Violence and the Ku Klux Klan Hearings, ed. Shawn L. Alexander (Boston, MA: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2015), 48. 
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seat in the Georgia legislature during Reconstruction, yet he refused.68 When he did not comply 
with the demand, the Klan targeted Colby with violence. His testimony read: 
“Question. You had voted in the legislature for Foster Blodgett, and had voted at the polls 
for Bullock and Grant?69  
Answer. Yes, sir.  
Question. And that was the reason they gave for whipping you?  
Answer. Yes sir; and they said I had influence with the negroes of other counties, and had 
carried negroes against them...”70 
 
The violence that Abram Colby experienced was directly linked to his political affiliation. Klan 
members who supported the Democratic Party saw him as a threat to their efforts in Georgia and 
sought to silence his voice and his vote. 
1868 in Georgia bore witness to both individual and group acts of violence aimed at 
black men and women. The Freedmen’s Bureau documented many of these attacks, including a 
race riot that took place. In fact, “[o]utrages and guerrilla warfare against [black men and 
women] were widespread in Georgia. General [John Randolph] Lewis of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau71 reported 260 attacks, whippings and murders of freedmen between January and 
November 1868. In September, there was a race riot at Camilla.”72 The Camilla riot occurred 
                                                
68 Colby, “Testimony to the Congressional Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, October 27 and 28, 
1871,” 48.  
69 The quotation references Foster Blodgett who was a Republican mayor of Augusta, Georgia 
during the early years of Reconstruction, Republican Rufus Bullock who served as Georgia’s 
governor from 1868-1871, and Republican President Ulysses S. Grant (United States Congress, 
“The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First Session Forty-
Second Congress; with an Appendix, Embracing the Laws Passed at that Session; also, Special 
Session of the Senate,” in Congressional Globe and Appendix First Session Forty-Second 
Congress: in Two Parts. Part I, Congressional Globe [Washington D.C.: F. & J. Rivers & 
George A. Bailey, 1871], 543). (Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of 
Georgia,” 150, 151, 156). 
70 Colby, “Testimony to the Congressional Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, October 27 and 28, 
1871,” 51. 
71 Paul A. Cimbala, “On the Front Line of Freedom: Freedmen's Bureau Officers and Agents in 
Reconstruction Georgia, 1865-1868,” in The Georgia Historical Quarterly 76, no. 3 (1992): 607. 
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when Democrats disrupted a Republican parade by firing on it, and in the end twenty black 
marchers were either injured or killed in the assault.73 The Camilla riot was not simply a protest 
that got out of hand and resulted in violence. Rather, the riot “had been part of a ‘concerted 
determination’ among whites in the Second Congressional District ‘to force the colored vote and 
to prevent a canvass by Republicans.’”74 Thus, the riot was an organized effort to reduce voter 
turnout among Republicans and restore the Democratic party to power. 
The violence organized by white Democrats in Camilla was extremely effective for 
advancing the party’s political agenda. Several outcomes from the riot highlight this. First, in the 
aftermath, Major O.H. Howard encouraged freedmen “to avoid political meetings except in their 
own neighborhoods, and ‘then always without arms.’”75 The advice was intended as a protective 
measure for the freedmen, yet it also had the consequence of limiting their political involvement 
and in turn, their political power.76 In addition, the riot scared many black Georgians in Camilla, 
causing them to stay home and avoid the polls. On election day only two Republicans cast their 
ballots.77 This incredibly low voter turnout in the aftermath of the Camilla riot illustrates its 
effectiveness. In fact, “[i]t was clear to most observers that campaign violence and election fraud 
did work.”78 The effectiveness of political violence created a cycle that popularized intimidation 
as it generated its intended consequence of maintaining white supremacy and granting power to 
the Democratic Party in Georgia. 
                                                
73 Egerton, The Wars of Reconstruction, 291. 
74 Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868,” 419. 
75 Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868,” 405, 419. 
76 Major O.H. Howard was a “white Union army veteran” who worked as the subassistant 
commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau in the Albany, Georgia area (Formwalt, “The Camilla 
Massacre of 1868,” 405).  
77 Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868,” 422. 
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Violent acts of terror alone were not enough to alter the election results in Georgia in the 
late 1860s and early 1870s, however. The Democratic Party’s use of more subtle intimidation 
tactics paired with the political terrorism further increased the party’s power in the state during 
the Reconstruction era. In the 1868 election for example, the successes of the Democratic party 
were due in part to restricting black men from voting utilizing a variety of tactics. In Crenshaw 
County, Georgia white officials strategically placed barricades so that “every [black] voter had to 
run the gauntlet of their jeers and threats.”79 This method of disenfranchisement for black voters 
served as a secondary measure to keep away those who were not deterred by the political 
terrorism that ran rampant throughout Georgia prior to the election. If violence and intimidation 
did not keep black voters away from the polls, then white Georgian Democrats would simply not 
allow black men to cast a ballot. This plan kept black men from voting by attempting to 
circumvent the “Civil War Amendments.”80  
                                                
79 Egerton, The Wars of Reconstruction, 253. 
80 In the years following the war, Congress passed the “Civil War Amendments” which altered 
the nation’s political landscape. The 13th Amendment which was passed in 1865 abolished 
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The violence and intimidation in Georgia in 1868 had consequences that impacted 
Georgia residents long after the new year began. One major impact81 of the 1868 violence was 
the restoration of military rule82 in Georgia under the direction of President Ulysses S. Grant. 83 
Unchecked Klan violence raised concerns about Georgia’s readiness to reenter the Union, and on 
December 22, 1869 Congress created stricter requirements for Georgia’s readmittance.84 This 
included agreeing to the Reorganization Act for Georgia in December of 1869,85 which  
“required the governor to summon the original legislature elected in April, 1868; the expelled 
[black legislators] were to be reseated, whites unable to fulfill the test oath were to be excluded, 
and the legislature was to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment before Georgia could be readmitted to 
the union.”86 Yet, these changes were not long term as the military intervention lasted only a year 
and Philip Joiner was the only black representative to serve more than one term.87  
Once again Georgia fell victim to the violence and chaos of political terrorism as White 
Democrats continued to utilize terror and fear in order to achieve their aims.88 In fact, Klan 
violence increased in many places in Georgia during the 1870 election and most of the victims 
were black.89 While Klan activity increased, it no longer took the same form as in previous years. 
                                                
81 As part of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, Congress placed the South under temporary 
military rule in hopes that the former Confederacy could “secure fundamental and lasting 
change” (Prince, Radical Reconstruction, 18). 
82 Georgia was under military rule until it was readmitted to the Union for the first time in the 
summer of 1868 after ratifying the 14th Amendment and sending their new state constitution to 
Congress for approval (Bradley, The Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877, 46). 
83 In January 1870, President Grant placed Georgia back under military control to “ensure the 
success of Georgia’s ‘second Reconstruction’” (Bradley, The Army and Reconstruction 1865-
1877, 57). 
84 Bradley, The Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877, 57. 
85 Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” 155. 
86 Matthews, “Negro Republicans in the Reconstruction of Georgia,” 155. 
87 Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868,” 423. 
88 Formwalt, “The Camilla Massacre of 1868,” 423.	
89 Trelease, White Terror, 238. 
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The 1870 election in Georgia saw less systematic violence than in 1868, but “the memory of 
earlier Ku Klux raids kept many [black men] from voting and stimulated others to cast 
Democratic ballots.”90  
Despite the attempts to quell political violence in the early 1870s, organized groups 
continued to terrorize black Georgians and Republicans. The new system of political terror that 
arose after the state’s re-admittance to the Union was less upfront and more difficult to punish. 
As Allen W. Trelease states,  
“[b]y the end of 1870 Georgia Democrats had devised a system of intimidation which no 
longer required the grosser outrages of the Ku Klux Klan…Georgia pioneered for the 
deep South in developing a more subtle and acceptable way of nullifying [black] 
majorities than the rustic terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan.”91  
 
Thus, political violence did not end with military interference or a new state constitution, rather 
it shifted forms and continued to run unchecked through the 1870s. 
Besides altering the economic system of the South, Reconstruction aimed to bring about 
legal equality between the races. The intervention of the federal government to accomplish this 
goal, paired with the idea that black men would have political power, including the right to vote, 
was unpopular across the South. The federal government, through the passage of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, forced the South to grant political rights to black men. Georgia was 
not readmitted to the Union until it ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, along with other 
stipulations, which did not occur until 1870.92 However, it is clear from the numerous incidents 
of political violence, especially attacks that occurred at night on black Southerners’ homes, or at 
the polls themselves, that these amendments were not always strictly enforced. The 
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Reconstruction Amendments were disliked by many Southerners and some worked to 
circumvent the amendments or flat out refused to enforce them. In fact, according to Joel Hays,  
After the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, African Americans 
gained the right to vote and the right to participate in the democratic process. The 
enfranchisement of the African American population led to the creation of white 
supremacist organizations that resorted to intimidation, violence, and assassinations to 
prevent African Americans from exercising their civil and voting rights.93   
 
These groups aimed to keep black men from exercising their right to vote and wanted to ensure 
that white supremacy would continue to reign in the South.  
Hannah Rosen’s, Terror in the Heart of Freedom: Citizenship, Sexual Violence, and the 
Meaning of Race in the Postemancipation South, depicts the era as a “region of terror” and 
highlights the prevalence of vigilantism that occurred during Reconstruction and made this an 
extremely violent era.94 Throughout the text, Rosen highlights the political motivation for these 
acts of violence as well as their implications by describing how organized groups of white men 
inflicted terror on black people in their homes at night, and how the actions of these groups, such 
as the Klan, were often justified in the minds of those inflicting the terror. She writes, “[r]umors 
circulating among whites to justify Klan violence described African American men and women 
as threatening the orderly arrangement of sexuality and domestic life along racial lines in 
southern society.”95 This excerpt highlights the sentiment that white Southerners viewed 
themselves as superior to their black neighbors and justified using violence in order to maintain 
societal order. 
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Political terrorism ran rampant throughout the South in this era, as many white 
Democrats utilized political violence to maintain a racial hierarchy and overthrow Republican 
rule. Yet, not all white Southerners sought to keep black men and women subservient and 
prevent black men from exercising their political rights. Governor James Lusk Alcorn of 
Mississippi96 published his views on the political situation of the state in 1867 and detailed his 
plan to address the newly gained rights of black men in the South.97 In his writing, Alcorn 
expressed his desire to uphold the rights granted to black men by Congress, and detailed his 
willingness to discuss politics with black men and even vote with them, as well as creating a 
political party that consisted of black and white men together.98 Many Mississippians viewed 
these beliefs as extreme and Alcorn while proposing a mixed race political party declared that, 
“[i]f this be radicalism, then indeed, gentlemen, do I confess that I am a thorough radical…”99 
Governor Alcorn’s approach to the political scene of Reconstruction was in stark contrast to the 
white supremacist sentiments expressed by group like the Klan or the Red Shirts that were active 
in Mississippi during the Reconstruction era. 
As time progressed, many individuals became frustrated with Reconstruction and wanted 
it and its violence to end. Southern whites and Democrats disliked the federal Reconstruction 
policy from the start but in the mid-1870s, even some Republicans and Northerners grew 
impatient with the process and its apparent failure. People across the nation were becoming tired 
of the divisions it caused in society, and many viewed the efforts as a failure because of the 
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persistent violence that accompanied them. In 1875, a decade after the Civil War ended, violence 
towards black Southerners and growing sentiments of despair and frustration were continually 
evident. Mississippi governor Adelbert Ames100 continually pleaded with the federal government 
to send him aid in quelling the violence throughout the state that threatened elections.101 
Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont replied to the request in 1875 with excerpts from President 
Ulysses S. Grant which read, “‘[t]he whole public are tired out with these annual autumnal 
outbreaks in the South, and the great majority are ready now to condemn any interference on the 
part of the Government.”102 At this time, a general weariness with Reconstruction set in across 
the nation, and many people wanted the federal government to stop interfering within Southern 
states. 
The political violence in both Mississippi and Georgia in the mid-1870s was so 
prominent in part because the federal government was at various points either unable or 
unwilling to address the violence and prevent it from occurring. The violence that accompanied 
the Reconstruction process was taking a toll on the federal government and its resources. Further, 
the cost of funding the Freedmen’s Bureau and the use of federal troops was a burden.103 
                                                
100 Adelbert Ames, deemed a carpetbagger, served as provisional governor of Mississippi after 
the war until 1870 when he was elected to the Senate. In 1873 Ames was elected governor of 
Mississippi and served in this role until Democrats resumed control in the state in 1876 and 
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Beginning in 1865, federal troops occupied the eleven former Confederate states to carry out the 
reconstruction process.104 When the federal government chose to intervene, they sent troops to 
Southern states to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments and attempt to control the rampant 
violence against Republicans and black Southerners. However, as time progressed the number of 
troops was reduced from 270,000 in June 1865 to 87,550 by January 1866 and only 3,230 by 
1876.105 The low number of available troops struggled to keep the violence at bay. The inability 
of federal military force to stop the widespread political violence in the South during this era 
sheds light on the deep entrenchment of racism and animosity in the post-war South. 
Federal troops were tasked with protecting the safety and rights of freedpeople in the 
South from attacks by white Southerners.106 However, this did nothing to prevent the violence 
long term, and federal military power could not be utilized forever. In 1874, Grant vocalized his 
concerns with Reconstruction and expressed his belief that it needed to come to an end.107 Grant 
believed that the effort was a failure and would keep the Republican Party from moving forward 
and winning elections.108 By distancing themselves from the failing process the Republicans 
could be more successful as a national party. However, those in favor of equality for black men 
and women feared that without the aid of the federal government, freedpeople would continue to 
be terrorized and white southern Democrats would bring the South back to its pre-Civil War 
days, except for legalized slavery. 
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The year 1875 saw a severe escalation in political violence towards black and white 
Republicans in Mississippi, as the general public was fed up with Reconstruction and federal 
troops were unable to stop the terror. This increase stemmed from the implementation of the 
“Mississippi Plan” as white Southern Democrats moved to destroy the power of the Republican 
party in the state. Joel Stanford Hays noted that the Mississippi Plan was intended to: 
nullify the effect of the Reconstruction laws, to restore a white minority to power through 
the agency of the Democratic Party, and in so doing emphasize to the African American 
population once and for all that they were to be subservient to the white population.109   
 
In essence, the plan’s goal was to re-establish white dominance in the South, bring the 
Democratic party into power in the state, and break free of the confines of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. These goals were achieved through both violent and nonviolent means.  
The intimidation of Republican voters, especially black men who went to the polls, was 
carried out by organized groups such as the White League and the Red Shirts in Mississippi, as 
federal intervention had shut down the Ku Klux Klan by 1872.110 These groups sought to return 
Mississippi to Democratic control and achieved this aim by terrorizing black men into either 
staying away from the polls or voting the Democratic ticket. In 1875, this plan was put into 
action and was ultimately successful in its goals. In February of 1876, James W. Lee wrote to 
Governor Ames and states, “[t]he policy of intimidation had been so successfully managed that 
many colored men kept away from the polls.”111 The Democratic Party’s intimidation of black 
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men altered the election outcomes in its favor by limiting the total number of votes for the 
Republican Party and guaranteeing a Democratic victory. 
While political violence in Mississippi had a profound impact on the elections of 1875 
and 1876 in the state, as Democrats utilized terror to advance their political agenda and retain the 
power of white supremacy, it did not go unnoticed by a national audience. Accusations of 
election tampering led to a Senate hearing in order to determine if the elections were fair, or if 
intimidation and election fraud had skewed the results. This hearing involved many witnesses, as 
various incidents were recounted and explored. The records from these proceedings are detailed 
in a testimony taken under the resolution of the Senate in December 1876. One such account 
describes the violence and intimidation that black men faced from Democratic “military clubs” 
while trying to exercise their right to vote. These organizations sought to return the South to 
Democratic rule by disrupting the political process. A witness at the proceedings described what 
he had been told by black Mississippians who had experienced the violence first-hand:  
Several leading colored men came to me after the election and told me what had occurred 
on the night before the election: that these men would gallop up to their houses, firing off 
their pistols and guns…[a]nd they would tell him, “[w]e have come here to tell you that 
you had better not go there to-morrow, as all the negroes are going to be killed…”112  
 
This intimidation achieved Democrats’ goals because many black men did not go to the polls for 
fear of being injured or killed. Further along in the transcript the witness explained, “[a] colored 
man told me that they had not gone to the election because of the firing of these men.”113 The 
organized Democrats’ intimidation tactics caused black Republican voters to stay away from the 
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polls. Through this election violence, white Democrats seized political control in 1875, as white 
supremacy once again reigned supreme in the state.114 As Democrats gained control of the 
legislature they forced the resignation of Republicans in the state, including Governor Ames, in 
order to further solidify their political power.115 Governor Ames resigned rather than face 
impeachment by the Democratic legislature, and after his time in office he remarked on 
Mississippi’s political position saying, “[y]es a revolution has taken place—by force of arms—
and a race are disenfranchised—they are to be returned to a condition of serfdom—an era of 
second slavery.”116 Thus, political terror effectively ended Reconstruction in Mississippi . 
The unchecked political terrorism that occurred in Georgia and Mississippi during the 
Reconstruction era highlights the complex and chaotic process that existed across the South in 
the post-Civil War era. On one hand, Mississippi chose to implement strict black codes and 
utilize organized political terrorism to accomplish its goals. On the other hand, Georgia initially 
opted for a more subtle approach to avoid federal interference, which later transformed into 
enormous political terrorism. Despite taking varying approaches to violence, white Democrats in 
the two states had similar aims: restore white supremacy and keep black men away from the 
polls. Both states succeeded in their goals as Reconstruction came to an end and racism 
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